Never in my life have I so bitterly regretted being right;
Outside the MoJ itself, there is universal agreement that the main cause of the crisis of violence, drug taking and self harm in our prisons was the cut in front line staff of nearly 1 in 3 made by the lamentable Grayling, coupled with loss of experienced staff and cuts in pay that made subsequent recruitment and retention much more difficult.
Tory Ministers have taken great pains both to refrain from claiming that the cuts had no effect, or stating catgeorically that the causes lay elsewhere, though the lamentable Grayling seemed to suggest that new drugs, gang culture, more serious offences and maybe the wrong sort of snow were the real causes and cutting staff had been a thoroughy brilliant wheeze on his part.
The figures from Scotland seemed to bear out the non Grayling view: the data, some years old, showed that there had been no cuts in staffing and that levels of assaults and self harm barely rose.
But the very latest data from Scotland via FoI show a very different picture. Staffing hasn't changed much but self harm and violence have nevertheless soared, just as in E and W. (Note that the definition of self harm changed in 2017, but the trend before and after that date is unmistakably sharply upwards.)
Note: assault and self harm rates show % change on 2013 base, on rt hand scale.
Indeed, when one plots trends in the two countries together, the similarity is striking. We started earlier, south of the border; but we have ended up in much the same place. The politics plays out differently, but then we dont have in Scotland a Left Opposition anxious to blame Govenrment for the sins of austerity, nor for that matter an Inspectorate with the same power to issue an Urgent Notification.
One must therefore revisit the explanation for the crisis south of the border. There seems now more force in MoJ's argument that it was not just, or even primarily, the staffing cuts that caused our crisis. The fact that the crisis hit our private prisons just as badly, thugh few of them experienced cuts in staffing, also points the same way.
Still, it would be entirely counter-intuitive to believe that removing 1 in 3 front line staff, inlcuding many experienced middle managers, and making recruitment and retention much more difficult, can have had no effect. That maybe has a bearing on the difference in timing. Or did the new drugs just take longer to reach Scottish prisons?
Richard Burgon, Shadow Justice Minister, had a field day with his debate on prisons and probation on 14 May, here. His advocacy of a return to monopoly services had both wind and tide with it, what with the disaster of botched probation privatisation plain for all to see, and a timely bit of analysis showing the levels of violence are higher in private than in public prisons.
But what really made his day was that David Gauke had nothing to say in defence of the private sector, other than bland platitudes about innovation and some favourable inspection reports. Granted it was difficult to use the argument that, thanks to Grayling's cuts, the public sector is as fucked up as the private sector (the public sector 'flagship' of Berwyn springs to mind). Difficult, too, to run the argument that the private sector is ony more violent because (even) more overcrowded.
But it is astonishing that he made no use of the Cambridge research that has shown the private sector stronger on 'respect' though weaker on 'control' (shorthand for a much more nuanced report), or improving dramatically at Birmingham in the first years after G4S took over; and that he failed also to point out what a scandal the public sector was when last a monopoly. It is also beyond belief that the civil servants appeared not to have noticed previously that private prisons have a higher level of violence, or to have any response to those figures, which they themselves had just put together.
As I pointed out in my book, one of the most astonishing, and unpardonable, things about privatisation has been Governments (Labour and Tory) complete lack of interest either in evaluating the results, or making the case publicly. The privatisers seem to think it unnecessary to make their case, even though polls showed as far back as 2011 that the public did not support privately run prisons. They now reap the reward.
There is a kind of institutional studidity in Government nowadays, on this and many other matters. The MoJ sees to have dispensed with its research unit altogether. That made Gauke's attempt to contrast the Governments' supposedly evidence based approach with Labour's ideological bent doubly painful - because on this occasion, Labour had the evidence, the Government had none. It is not Labour that will kill off outsourcing, one of the biggest policy experiments in UK history: it has already been killed off by the ignorance and incompetence of Tory Ministers.
Not that Labour emerge with any credit. Burgon, like Khan before him, has never shown any real interest in justice, beyond a weapon to beat Government with on cuts and privatisation. In particular, Labour have been way behind all other parties in committing to sentencing reform. Everything Labour has to say about the importance of rehabilitation has been said dozens of times before, by every single Minister right back to Michael Howard. Labour, too, are bereft of any real ideas (1), other than restoring the monopoly power of their union friends, the Prison Officers' Association . And there is very good evidence as to where that leads.
(1) Has there been any significant new idea in the past quarter century - since Labour introduced 'what works' evidence-based interventions in 1997 (but sadly not evidence-based sentencing, on which Government continues down the decades to do what it knows does not work).
Grayling with mouth wide open, foot sure to follow.
Gauke's announcement today of renationalisation of the probation service was the right decision and will be welcomed by everyone (except 'Reform', the PR people for outsourcers, I notice). Indeed, it was inevitable, the Balkanised structure Grayling set up had to be replaced by a unifed service, and that could only be publicy run.
Many questions remain about the new structure, not least cost.
Much has been made of the figure put out by the National Audit Office of £500m, but that was the cost in excess of what the Grayling reforms should have cost Similarly the Public Accounts Committee). But the Grayling structure could never have worked, that is now clear.
The important figure is the cost of the new nationalised service compared to what it would have cost, had Grayling been strangled at birth, and the old public system continued. That, together with set up and transitional costs (which may run into many tens of millions), would give us the true 'cost of Grayling'. We won't know that figure for some time, not least because MoJ is now consulting on the new structure. The calculation is complex, for example Grayling extended probation supervision to short term prisoners, so extra workload, but then total court ordered supervision of offenders has fallen - and Gauke wants to do away with short terms sentences altogether.
What is certain is that the new arrangements will cost a shedload of money more than MoJ has available, since their spending plans were based on Grayling's reforms working, and part of that was to get cost out of the old public sector structure. The discussions with HMT must have been interesting, as MoJ was struggling with a £1bn overspend even before this volte face.
If one adds to this the cost of Grayling's bizarre contracts for ferry services with companies who don't in point of fact run ferries, which were then cancelled at huge expense, the successful claim by Eurotunnel, the forthcoming claim by rival ferry companies, the legal actions by Arriva and Stagecoach relating to Grayling's handling of rail franchise contratcs, to name only the ones we know about, Grayling seems to be one of the most expensive idiots in politics (a closely fought field). It looks like the all up costs of Grayling to the British state could be as much as £500,000 for each day in office.
(I refer only to financial costs. There are then the human costs - staff made redundant, staff public and private sector alike over-worked, offenders not properly supervised, left homeless, self harming and being assaulted in prisons as a result of those cuts....)
What this saga reveals is that the system of accountability on which Parliament relies isn't fit for purpose. Because if you keep moving quickly enough from one Department to another, it's your hapless successors who have to clear up the mess you dumped on them, and answer for it.
The Public Accounts Committee should innovate - they are always demanding that the public setcor innovate, now's their chance to do so. Hold an inquiry into the consequences for public spending of Christopher Stephen Grayling.
In 2013 the Government announced that it had just discovered that G4S and SERCO has been billing excessively for their contracts for electronic monitoring of offenders. The companies were made to pay back some £200m. It has been established that amongst other things, the companies were billing for work they had not done.
The Government referrred them to the Serious Fraud Office. 6 years later, the SFO are still mulling over the case. Granted, it is one of the most complex in the entire history of the SFO, featuring as it does no fewer than one victim, no fewer than 2 companies, no fewer than 2 contracts and no fewer than one jurisdiction. Obviously, that must takes many years to unpick!
Meanwhile, here is an interesting graph. It is interesting because as a general rule, if volumes of work done under contract rise, in this case getting towards doubling, the unit cost - the cost per item - can be expected to fall. This is because fixed costs are spread over more items. This is a basic rule of intelligent contracting.
But in this case, the unit cost actually increased as volumes increased. That would be bizarre whether or not the companies billed for work not done. And suggests that there was something very wrong indeed with the contracts themselves.
Source: National Audit Office, 'The Ministry of Justice's electronic monitoring contracts', 2013
Students of Civil service arcania will be familiar with the procedure for an Accounting Officer's request for ministerial directions. Briefly the Permanent Secretary who heads a Department has a personal, statutory responsibility to Parliament for use of public money, independent of that of ministers, requiring that he be satisfied that it meets the four tests of regularity, propriety, value for money, and feasibility. If ministers require civil servants to act in a way that does not meet those tests, the Accounting Office must write to the minister seeking a formal Direction to proceed, and his letter and the minister’s reply must be published, and the National Audit Office and Treasury must be notified. Responsibility for the decision then rests with the minister giving the direction.
Considering how daft, ill-considered, ineffective and wasteful so much Government spending is, the procedure is surprisingly seldom used – some stats collected by the Institute for Government are here . The National Audit Office has commented that officials lack confidence in challenging ministerial decisions, not least because it might damage their career projects. (Information from Martin Stanley’s excellent website www.civilservant.org.uk.)
Such an exchange had just been published between Sir Richard Heaton, Permanent Secretary of the MoJ and David Gauke (here and here). Gauke wanted to pay the debts of subcontractors to Working Links, whose 3 Community Rehabilitation Companies went into administration, due to loss making contracts. Heaton noted that there was no legal obligation to make good losses by subs, and rightly questioned whether using public money in this way would pass the tests of propriety and value for money. After all, if the subs had a beef it was with Working Links as main contractor. Heaton concluded that such payments would create a ‘moral hazard ‘ – i.e. a situation in which a company takes on a risky business, but knows it will in fact always be bailed out – of which there are innumerable examples in outsourcing including as indeed had previously happened the CRCs themselves.
Gauke’s response is interesting. He said the subs had asked MoJ to stump up in view of “the unique circumstances of this first-generation probation outsourcing, the comfort given by my predecessors about how the Government would steward this market, their status as ‘Permitted Subcontractors’ in our contract structure, and the extent to which these organisations were delivering frontline statutory services on behalf of Government.” He added that a partly privatised service could be hard to maintain if subs bore their own losses. So he made the Direction, again quoting ‘unique circumstances’ that meant Government has a ‘moral duty of care’ to the subs.
What was, then, ‘unique’ in these circumstances? After all, Government contracts all the time, passes risks to contractors all the time (that is a main purpose of outsourcing), contractors do the same to their subs all the time, those subs deliver ‘frontline statutory services on behalf of Government’ all the time, and contractors go belly up quite often. Moreover, there is no shortage of other contractors waiting to take over business.
The idea that if contractors or their subs get into difficulties, Government has aa ‘moral duty of are’ always to cover their losses would of course make a total mockery of outsourcing, which would instantly become pointless and a huge waste of funds.
Was the ‘unique’ consideration that created a 'moral duty' to meet subs' losses that the then Minister who implemented probation privatisation, Grayling, acted recklessly and by so doing, mislead the subs, or made perhaps understandings and promises which he should not have done (‘comfort given by my predecessors’)? Considering Grayling’s record of dubious spending decisions and dodgy contracts, those possibilities must be considered. We don’t know.
The only body able to probe this is the National Audit Office. It should do so.
Last August, Rory Stewart said he’d resign if, by August 2019, levels of violence and drug abuse in 10 target jails had not fallen. He said that meant a ‘substantial’ reduction, in the order of 10 or 25%. Here are the results after 4 months (August-December 2018), for assaults and, since this is one of the main concerns, and is after all a form of violence, self-harm, in the 10 targets prisons. We won’t be told the figures for drugs till July, at earliest.
They show a fall of 13% for self-harm, and 19% for assaults – in only 4 months. Remarkable progress! Stewart can likely keep his job.
But…. note a few things, if you will. First, there is nothing exceptional about the fall in the 10 target prisons. Here is the change over August for all prisons, compared to the target prisons.
In fact, the fall in assaults is much the same for the target prisons as for all prisons – and for self-harm, all prisons did better than the target prisons. So it seems that what did the job was not Rory Stewart’s personal focus on the 10 prisons, but the result of management action across the whole estate. Now, who was running prisons during that time….name slips my mind. Whoever it was, he did a good job.
(Although another explanation – one too seldom considered, nowadays, when every tiny change is considered the fault of achievement of those in power – is just that all trends come to an end. It may be that drug consumption for example has reached its natural limits because prisoners simply couldn’t take any more drugs. Or because of the same arcane changes in society that created the problem in the first place.)
The second thing follows from the first. Experienced staff, and £10m, were diverted from other prisons to the 10 targets prisons, robbing Peter to pay Paul. Yet the rest of the prison service, deprived of those resources, actually did slightly better than the prisons to which resources were diverted. Raising the question of whether that diversion was more than a political ploy.
The third thing follows from the second. What, then, can have changed in late 2018 that might account for falling assault and self-harm, across the whole estate? Well, just possibly the same thing which, in the opinion of everyone except Ministers, created the problem in the first place - staffing levels. In 2018, staff numbers picked up again, as the Grayling cuts were partially reversed. In other words, maybe this isn’t so much the triumph of Rory Stewart, as further evidence that the appalling collapse of safety and decency in prisons since 2011 is the work of Tory Ministers.
The fourth thing follows from the third. It is, simply, this horrendous graph.
Seen in this light, Rory Stewarts’ ‘achievement’ is to stabilise the system, so that prisons are now ‘only’ twice as violent as when the Tories came in. Not much of a boast, one would think, for a Tory minister to make.
The fifth thing follows from the fourth. Rory Stewart presents himself as a man of integrity. But he avoids ever saying what he believes caused the deterioration of safety in prisons, and specifically, whether the Grayling cuts are to blame, yes or no. At any rate, I haven’t found a clear statement from him on the matter. And of course, he can’t say that the staffing cuts are to blame, because he would be blaming a senior colleague, and because he’ll never get Treasury to fund MoJ to restore staff staffing levels. Likewise, he has said that the system can’t be run properly without cutting the courts’ use of custody, but he and Gauke have avoided doing anything about it. Finally, I note again the nauseating deceit of presenting the partial reversal of the Grayling cuts as a staff increase. Likewise it takes some nerve to trumpet a reduction in violence, when what the rest of us see is an appalling increase.
So while this is undoubtedly good news, I will hold off the champagne for the time being.
We're all aware of funding pressure on public services - prisons, probation, courts, legal aid, NHS, social care, schools, universities, roads, defence, you name it - none of them now able to offer acceptable services. The bill to restore something like what we used to think acceptable, maybe £100bn a year? Here, to make you really depressed, is the long term picture: the trend line shows the very slow but seemingly unstoppable decline of the rate of growth in the UK economy over 60 years. And that's before taking account of the post Brexit slow down, the ageing population, climate change....No, I dont know what to do about it either, except to say, the future has to be different. We don't know yet how different.
The refusal to see this is one of the reasons I am not a enthusast for Corbynism. The great Aneurin Bevan famously declared that "the language of priorities is the religion of socialism" (though the great Peter Simple pointed out that you can change the order of the nouns any way you like and it still sounds profound). Corbyn and Co, with their assumption that everything can be afforded if we just chuck out the Tories and switch the printing preses to over-drive, clearly do not know that language.
Research by Katherine Auty and Alison Liebling, just published (behind paywall – how can that be right, with research done with public money? – but message me if interested) confirms that unsafe prisons don’t reduce reoffending. It takes measures for the quality of prison life (generated through anonymised surveys of prisoners’ and staff) developed years ago by Alison, and relates them to variations in reconvictions rates for those prisons, by excluding other variables.
As a result, we can now say definitively, what common sense surely told us previously, that a safe, stable, decent prison is likely to reduce reoffending and a violent and chaotic one is not. It is the measures of safety and security that are most strongly associated with reduced reoffending, especially ‘prisoner adaption’ (the prisoners perceived need to trade or make alliances within the prison, presumably relating to drugs and so on): “for every one-unit increase in the prisons mean score for prisoner adaptation there would be a 10.67 decrease in rates of proven reoffending”. An astonishingly high figure, larger I recall than most offender programmes (of course, they are linked: if a prisoner feels safe, he/she will benefit more from such programmes). Other strong correlations were with measures of prisoner safety, policing and security, and drugs and exploitation.
The message for MoJ is that if prisons remain violent, chaotic places full of drugs, as is the case in many now, you won’t reduce reoffending. Indeed, I wonder if one could use this work to estimate how many more hundreds of thousands of crimes have been caused Grayling’s cuts? If anyone can manage this in a statistically convincing way, I am happy to raise funds to put up posters around his constituency!
Fig 1: an intelligent Grayling
Impressive journalism by the FT has uncovered the scandal of Berwyn Prison, costing £220m (say, a thousand homes unbuilt) - but still half empty two years after opening, because of multiple cock ups. It has the dubious claim of being the first prison actually designed to be overcrowded, thus ignoring all the lessons of the Mubarek Inquiry (a teenager horribly murdered by a racist with whom he was forced to share a cell), just to undercut the private sector and so avoid open competition. It is more violent, yet more costly, than other such prisons.
Since the prison opened, 338 ambulances have been sent there, the police have been called 135 times and the fire service 27 times, the FT’s FOIs show. Use of force, supposedly a last resort, is running at an exceptionally high level. “The partner of the prisoner seeking a transfer said she thought some young staff had “got a bit of power and it’s gone to their heads” says the FT.
The healthcare unit is a disaster. The health team’s report described a “lack of compliance with infection prevention and control standards……and unsuitable design of facilities ”, which made treating patients “unsafe” and “required a complete rebuild of some areas”. Further, the FT reports that prisoners have been taken off prescription anti-depressants, anti-psychotics and painkillers without their consent, which some inmates say has driven them to self-medicate with illegal drugs.
An independent report lambasts the design of the prison generally, including no proper ventilation in the house blocks and problematic noise levels.
The workshops are another disaster. “They were not ready when the prison opened, and lacked basics like electrical work, fixtures and fittings. “The lack of work spaces has probably been the greatest challenge for everyone who lives and works at Berwyn,” the then Governor wrote in his anniversary message to staff a year after the prison opened. “The procurement process has not yet gone as we would have hoped or planned [and], consequently, there are too many men left on the communities during the day.” Today, two full years after the prison opened, the workshop buildings are still not ready. “There were just so many delays, it was ridiculous,” said Mark Gilbert of recycling company Emerald Trading, one of the original subcontractors, who became fed up of waiting and pulled out.
Imagine how the Guardian, Labour, unions would be frothing over this if G4S ran it! Obviously, they would say, the private sector is incompetent, wasteful, even wicked! But it’s public sector - so they keep quiet. If there is one thing I utterly despise, it is keeping quiet about wrong-doing because done by ‘your’ side. The National Audit Office and Justice Committee ought to look into this.
I was formerly Finance Director of the Prison Service and then Director of the National Offender Management Service responsible for competition. I also worked in the NHS and an IT company. I later worked for two outsourcing companies.
Click below to receive regular updates